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INTRODUCTION

The state of lawyers' ethical "knowledge" is poor. By that, I mean that
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the authorities interpreting it
do a poor job of defining "knowledge"; of explaining or justifying the use
of the knowledge standard in the rules; and of relating the knowledge

*Brokaw Professor of Corporate Law, University of Virginia. I thank Jill Pritzker and
Reuven Roslyn for excellent research assistance.
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requirement to, and reconciling it with, other ethical and legal
requirements. As a result, many lawyers have less "knowledge" of their
ethical and legal obligations than they ought to have. Moreover, lawyers
who understand the knowledge problem, such as drafters of ethics codes,
are apparently unwilling to do anything about it. The reason is that lawyers
often view the knowledge standard as an important means of limiting
lawyer responsibility. That view, however, is misleading.
The terms "knowingly," "known," and "knows" appear in almost every
category of ethical rules: those dealing with the lawyer-client relationship,'
the lawyer's role as advocate and duties to the court,2 the lawyer's
obligations to third parties,3 the lawyer's responsibilities within law firms, 4
the lawyer's duties concerning public service,' and the lawyer's obligations
to the profession. 6 The Terminology section of the Model Rules defines
these terms to mean "actual knowledge of the fact in question," and then
adds: "A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances." 7
There is no comment explaining this definition.
The problem starts with the meaning of this definition. Its two 'sentences
are in some tension.
If actual knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances, a lawyer can violate an ethical rule requiring "knowledge"
even if the lawyer does not "actually know." A common resolution is that
the two sentences establish an objective rather than a subjective standard of
proof for actual knowledge. 8 Thus, as a practical matter, the rules allow a
disciplinary authority to prove actual knowledge by circumstantial
evidence, rather than solely by a lawyer's admission of knowledge as part
of the disciplinary proceeding, or by the testimony of some third party to
whom the lawyer had earlier stated his or her intentions. 9 Moreover, an

1. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RR. 1.2(d), 1.4(a)(5), 1.8(a), 1.9(b),
1.10(a), 1.11 (b), 1. 11 (c), 1. 12(c), 1.13 (b), 1.18(c) (2013).
2. See id. RR. 3.3, 3.4(c), 3.8(a), (d), (g), (h).
3. See id. RR. 4.1, 4.2.
4. See id. RR. 5.1(c), 5.3(c).
5. See id. RR. 6.3, 6.4, 6.5(a).
6. See id. RR. 8.1, 8.3(b), (c), 8.4(a), (f).
7. Id. R. 1.0(f).
8. Another way to resolve the tension is to say that "all conclusions about
someone else's state of mind must be derived from circumstantial evidence," even
under a subjective standard. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., W. WILLIAM HODES, & PETER
R. JARvIS, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §§ 1-23, 1-50 (3d ed. Supp. 2012). Under this
interpretation, the "inferred from circumstances" sentence is a superfluous truism.
9. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. d (2000)
(stating that "a finding of knowledge does not require that the lawyer confess or to
otherwise admit the state of mind required for the offense"); Rebecca Roiphe, The
Ethics of Willful Ignorance, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 187, 196 (2011) (arguing that
"inferred from circumstances ... prescribes an objective standard of proof but does not
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objective standard of knowledge means that a lawyer cannot disprove
knowledge simply by sincerely contending that the lawyer did not believeo
that some fact was true or that some legal rule existed or would be
interpreted in a certain way. This explanation does not completely
eliminate the tension. The question remains: what circumstantial evidence
is sufficient to find actual knowledge? Put another way, what does the
actual knowledge standard intend to exclude?
The most accepted answer is that the actual knowledge standard aims to
exclude a duty to inquire. In particular, the Terminology section defines
"reasonably should know," which appears in a number of ethics rules," as
denoting "that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would
ascertain the matter in question." 12 The distinction between an actual
knowledge standard, which includes no duty of inquiry, and a reasonably
should know standard, which includes such a duty, raises a number of
questions. First, does the knowledge standard include recklessness or
willful blindness, which lies between "know" and "reasonably should
know?" Second, how does the knowledge standard apply if a lawyer
otherwise has a legal or ethical duty to inquire and fails to satisfy it? Third,
how does the knowledge requirement interact with rules of imputation?1 3

change the substantive rule").
10. "Belief' under the Model Rules means "that the person involved actually
supposed the fact in question to be true." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(a).
Belief may also "be inferred from circumstances."
11. See id. RR. 1.13(f), 2.3(b), 2.4(b), 3.6(a), 4.3, 4.4(b). Interestingly, the phrase
also appears in several comments not accompanying or interpreting a rule in which the
phrase appears. See id. R. 1.0 cmt. 10 (stating that "screening measures must be
implemented as soon as practical after a lawyer or law firm knows or reasonably should
know that there is a need for screening"); id. R. 1.2 cmt. 13 (stating that "[i]f a lawyer
comes to know or reasonably should know that a client expects assistance not permitted
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. . . , the lawyer must consult with

the client regarding the limitations on the lawyer's conduct," and citing Rule 1.4(a)(5)).
The "reasonably should know" standard in comment 13 to Rule 1.2 is inconsistent with
the rule to which it refers, Rule 1.4(a)(5), which requires a lawyer to "consult with the
client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct" only when the lawyer
"knows that the client expects" unlawful or unethical assistance. A rule's text trumps
any inconsistent comment, id. scope 21, but the comment's existence creates
uncertainty.
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.00). One might also distinguish
"know" from "reasonably believes," R. 1.0(i), but "reasonable belief' is generally used
to discourage lawyers from actions they might otherwise be inclined to take based on
their subjective belief, see id. RR. 1.6(b), 1.7(b)(1), 1.13(c), 1.14(b), 1.16(b)(2), 2.3(a),
3.4(e), 3.4(f)(2), 3.6(c), 3.8(e), 8.5(b)(2), whereas "reasonably should know" is
generally used to encourage lawyers to investigate when they might otherwise be
inclined not to do so.
13. This Article will not consider a fourth key question about knowledge: in
situations of factual or legal uncertainty, what quantum of knowledge is necessary to
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I will argue in this Article that the Model Rules should be revised to
answer these three related questions and thereby provide clearer guidance
First, the Model Rules should expressly incorporate
to lawyers.
recklessness into the definition of "knowledge" or at least should expressly
incorporate this standard whenever a duty to inquire or a duty to
communicate otherwise exists under the rules or other law. Second, one
way to show recklessness or willful blindness is through a deliberate breach
of an otherwise existing duty to inquire. The knowledge requirement
should not be interpreted to negate or limit duties of inquiry that otherwise
exist.14 Third, like inquiry, communication is an important means by
which lawyers acquire knowledge, and just as lawyers in many situations
have duties to inquire, they also often have duties to communicate. The
duty to communicate is the basis for rules of imputation. Thus, just as the
knowledge standard should not be used to negate otherwise existing duties
to investigate, neither should it be used to negate otherwise existing duties
to communicate, and thereby defeat imputation.
I.

RECKLESSNESS OR WILLFUL BLINDNESS

Recklessness is a common scienter standard in the law of intentional
torts, as well as criminal law, especially in the law of fraud.'
Transactional lawyers in particular are familiar with the recklessness
standard because it plays an important role in securities fraud and other
business crimes and torts. Although authorities define recklessness in
various ways, a commonly cited definition is Judge Friendly's in United
States v. Benjamin, an important securities fraud precedent. Benjamin

satisfy the knowledge standard? This aspect of knowledge is particularly important for
addressing issues such as client perjury.
14. Around the time the Model Rules were drafted, one group proposed the
following definition of "knowledge":
A lawyer knows certain facts, or acts knowingly or with knowledge of facts,
when a person with that lawyer's professional training and experience would
be reasonably certain of those facts in view of all the circumstances of which
the lawyer is aware. A duty to investigate or inquire is not implied by the use
of these words, but may be explicitly required under particular rules. Even in
the absence of a duty to investigate, however, a studied rejection of reasonable
inferences is inadequate to avoid ethical responsibility.
THE ROSCOE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT 12 (1982).
15. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 98 cmt.

c (2000) ("For purposes of common-law damage recovery, reckless as well as knowing
misrepresentation by a lawyer may be actionable.").
16. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 862 (2d Cir. 1964).

2014

THE STATE OF LAWYER KNOWLEDGE

119

holds that a lawyer has the requisite intent for securities fraud if the lawyer
"deliberately closed his eyes to facts he had a duty to see . . . or recklessly

stated as facts things of which he was ignorant."1 7 Moreover, a corporate
lawyer's "special situation and continuity of conduct" may create an
inference that the lawyer "did know the untruth of what he said or wrote." 18
Whether recklessness satisfies the knowledge standard under the Model
Rules is unsettled.19 Model Rule 1.0 and its comments do not say. Under a
textualist or structuralist approach, the answer is straightforward.
Recklessness makes an appearance in just one rule, Model Rule 8.2(a).20
Thus, the fact that the drafters use "recklessness" in this rule while using
the actual knowledge standard elsewhere (and even in Model Rule 8.2(a)
itself) suggests that "actual knowledge" does not incorporate the
recklessness standard. 2'
17.

Id.

18. Id. at 861-62 (quoting Bentel v. United States, 13 F.2d 327, 329 (2d. Cir.
1926)) (emphasis in original).
19. CompareRoiphe, supra note 9, at 190, 196 (arguing that "[d]eliberately turning
a blind eye to relevant facts. . . would not meet" the knowledge requirement under the
ethics rules and advocating for a change in the definition of knowledge, but
acknowledging a "less persuasive interpretation" that "willful ignorance" could be
viewed as incorporated in the definition of "knowledge"), and Carl A. Pierce, Client
Misconduct in the 21st Century, 35 U. MEM. L. REv. 731, 801 (2005) (arguing that "it

appears as if the Kutak Commission [which drafted the original version of the Model
Rules] did not want lawyers to be subject to discipline for making statements of fact or
law with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the statement except as
specifically provided in the rules" but then advocating for a recklessness standard),
with Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 11, 24 (2010) (arguing that the "willful blindness" doctrine "is available
in disciplinary actions"), and Roger C. Cramton, George M. Cohen & Susan P. Koniak,
Legal and EthicalDuties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REv. 725, 756

n.137 (2004) (arguing that the Model Rules "appear to adopt the 'willful blindness'
standard" based on the comments to Rules 1.13 and 4.2), and HAZARD, JR., HODES, &
JARvis, supra note 8, §§ 1-23, 1-50, 1-51 (stating that disciplinary authorities will
"infer" actual knowledge from "circumstances" when they conclude that a lawyer
"must have known" and stating that "it will sometimes be impossible to believe that a
lawyer lacked the requisite knowledge, unless he deliberately tried to evade it," but in
that case the lawyer "already knows too much") (citing Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 854),
and CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 696 (1987) (stating that a lawyer
"may not avoid the bright light of a clear fact by averting [his or her] eyes or turning
[his or her] back").
20. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.2(a) (2013) (stating that a lawyer
"shall not make a statement that the lawyer knows to be false or with reckless disregard
as to its truth or falsity concerning the qualifications or integrity of a judge,
adjudicatory or public legal officer, or of a candidate for election or appointment to
judicial or legal office").
21. Of course, the justification for giving more priority to deterring a lawyer from
lying about the qualifications or integrity of judges, see id. R. 8.2(a), than to, say,
deterring a lawyer from assisting a client in committing fraud against ordinary people,
see, e.g., id. R. 1.2(d) (using an actual knowledge standard) is not immediately obvious.
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On the other hand, the comments to several Model Rules seem to support
a version of the recklessness standard. For example, the comment to
Model Rule 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal, states that "although a
lawyer should resolve doubts about the veracity of testimony or other
evidence in favor of the client, the lawyer cannot ignore an obvious
falsehood." 2 2 Reliance on these comments raises several difficulties,
however.
First, the comments are not authoritative,2 3 and not all states adopt them.
Second, the comments do not clearly endorse the Benjamin standard of
recklessness or willful blindness. Ignoring an "obvious falsehood" is
arguably not quite the same as closing one's eyes to "facts [one] ha[s] a
duty to see." 24 The "obvious falsehood" standard in the comment to Model
Rule 3.3. may simply mean that a lawyer may not ignore information that
appears to be false on its face, as opposed to meaning that a lawyer may not
ignore suspicious and readily available facts that might reveal or lead to
discovery of falsity if examined.25 Third, not every Model Rule including a
knowledge standard has an accompanying comment admonishing lawyers
not to ignore the obvious. This difference might suggest that the drafters
intended their version of the recklessness standard to apply only to those
knowledge-based rules with a specific comment endorsing that standard.2 6
22. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8. The Model Rules
include similar comments accompanying two other rules. See id. R. 1.13 cmt. 3
(stating that "knowledge can be inferred from circumstances, and a lawyer cannot
ignore the obvious."); id. R. 4.2 cmt. 8 (stating that a lawyer "cannot evade the
requirement of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing eyes to the obvious"). It is
not clear what to make of the fact that the comments have slightly different wording.
In particular, the comments to Rule 1.13 and 4.2 simply refer to ignoring or closing
eyes to the "obvious," whereas the comment to Rule 3.3 adds the qualifier "falsehood."
Notably, the ABA adopted the three comments at different times: the comment to Rule
4.2 in 1995 (following the publication of ABA Op. 95-396, which used similar
language), the comment to Rule 3.3 in 2002, and the comment to Rule 1.13 in 2003
(following the recommendations of the ABA Task Force on Corporate Responsibility).
See generally A.B.A., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982-2005 (2006).
23. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope 21 ("The Comments are intended as
guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authoritative."). Somewhat
ironically, that statement itself is a comment (though not one accompanying a rule),
and so arguably is itself not authoritative.
24. Benjamin, 328 F.2d at 862.
25. See William Wernz, An Attorney's Ethics Duty to Ascertain and Other State of
Mind Issues - Thoughts and Cases (draft on file with author) (emphasis added)
(arguing that the comments "do not impose a duty to 'ascertain' even that which could
be known with small effort").
26. The "lawyer cannot ignore the obvious" comment to Model Rule 3.3 does not
even clearly apply to all parts of the rule; the comment is directed only to the Rule
3.3(a)(3), which prohibits a lawyer from "offer[ing] evidence the lawyer knows to be
false," or rectifying the previous submission of evidence when the lawyer "comes to
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Otherwise, one would have expected the drafters to add a recklessness
comment to the definition of knowledge in Model Rule 1.0. But there is
none. In particular, if the recklessness standard applies only to those rules
for which there is a comment referencing that standard, the primary ethics
rules dealing with transactional fraud, Model Rules 1.2(d) and 4.1, would
not incorporate the recklessness standard. 27 That interpretation would raise
important issues of inconsistency among ethical obligations. For example,
fraud on the court would be governed by the recklessness standard (Model
Rule 3.3), but not fraud in transactions, unless Model Rule 1.13 (which
includes a recklessness comment) applied. That interpretation also would
mean that the recklessness standard is conspicuously absent from the ethics
rules dealing with an area of law-transactional fraud-in which
recklessness is the generally accepted standard.
Drawing on the general legal standard, reported cases in several
jurisdictions have held that "a reckless state of mind, constituting scienter,
[is] equivalent to 'knowing' for disciplinary purposes." 28 Similarly, other

know of its falsity." See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 8. Does that
mean that the comment is inapplicable to Rules 3.3(a)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from
"knowingly" making a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal), 3.3(a)(2)
(prohibiting a lawyer from "knowingly" failing to disclose legal authority "known" to
be adverse), 3.3(b) (requiring a lawyer who "knows" that a person commits fraud on a
tribunal to take remedial action), and 3.3(d) (requiring a lawyer in an ex parte
proceeding to reveal material facts "known" to the lawyer)? The comment to the
parallel provision in the Restatement, § 120, endorses the willful blindness standard.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 120 cmt. c (2000) (stating
that under the actual knowledge requirement of the rule "a lawyer may not ignore what
is plainly apparent, for example, by refusing to read a document").
27. Rule 1.2(d) says that a "lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent." MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUNCT R. 1.2(d). Rule 4.1 says that a lawyer representing a client "shall
not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to
disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6." Id. R. 1.6 A
Reporter's Note and comment to the parallel provisions in the Restatement endorse the
recklessness standard. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94
& reporter's note to cmt. g (stating the Reporter's view that "the preferable rule is that
proof of a lawyer's conscious disregard of facts is relevant evidence, which, together
with other evidence bearing on the question, may warrant a finding of actual
knowledge"); id. § 98 & cmt. c ("For purposes of professional discipline, the lawyer
codes generally incorporate the definition of misrepresentation employed in the civil
law of tort damage liability for knowing misrepresentation, including the element[]
of ... scienter. .. ."); see also ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(a) (2010)
(adopting "reasonably should know" standard); KY. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
4.1(b) (1989) (omitting knowledge requirement); Nebraska ex. Rel. Neb. State Bar
Ass'n v. Holscher, 230 N.W.2d 75, 84 (Neb. 1975) (finding predecessor to Rule 4.1
violated by conduct that is "careless and recklessly negligent").
28. People v. Small, 962 P.2d 258, 260 (Colo. 1998) (citing cases from several
jurisdictions where courts equated a reckless state of mind with 'knowing' in a
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jurisdictions have interpreted actual knowledge to incorporate "willful
blindness," in some cases distinguishing that standard from recklessness
(and thereby avoiding the textualist conflict with Model Rule 8.2).29
The uncertain status of Model Rule 8.4(c) adds to the confusion. Model
Rule 8.4(c), which has no express knowledge requirement, makes it
unethical for a lawyer to "engage in conduct ... involving fraud," 3 0 and
Model Rule 1.0(d) specifically incorporates the substantive and procedural
law of fraud into the term "fraud" under the Model Rules.3 1 Because the
law of fraud generally uses a recklessness standard of intent, Model Rule
8.4(c) may thus incorporate recklessness via other law. A number of
jurisdictions have taken this approach and applied the recklessness standard

disciplinary context). Small recognizes an exception to the recklessness standard for
the misappropriation of client funds on the ground that the usual discipline for violating
that rule is disbarment and so a stricter standard of knowledge is appropriate. Id. For
other cases adopting a recklessness standard in disciplinary matters, see Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrona, 908 A.2d 1281, 1288 (Pa. 2006) (approving
recommendation of disciplinary board applying recklessness standard to find violations
of several rules, including Model Rule 3.3(a)(1), which includes a "knowing"
requirement) and Fla. Bar v. Calvo, 630 So.2d 548, 550 n.3 (Fla. 1993) (disbarring
lawyer for knowingly assisting in a client's securities fraud and finding that his "acts or
omissions at a minimum constituted reckless misconduct").
29. See In re Goldstone, 839 N.E.2d 825, 830 (Mass. 2005) (finding that even if
lawyer "did not have actual knowledge that the billings he sent [to the client] were false
and that he was not entitled to the fees and costs claimed, he consciously avoided
obtaining readily available information that would have put him on actual notice, and
thus his actions constituted wilful blindness and intentional misconduct"); In re Skevin,
517 A.2d 852, 857 (N.J. 1986) (upholding discipline of a lawyer for misappropriation
of client funds under knowledge standard, and holding that knowledge can be
established by demonstrating "willful blindness," defined as a "situation where the
party is aware of the highly probable existence of a material fact but does not satisfy
himself that it does not in fact exist"); Ga. Formal Advisory Op. 05-10 (2006)
(applying "willful blindness" standard to Model Rule 5.1(c)); cf In re Wines, 370
S.W.2d 328, 334 (Mo. 1963) (stating that even though the lawyer had "no specific
intent to deceive . . ., there was nevertheless an independent representation [of facts] by
[the lawyer] ... when he knew no such facts and had made no effort whatever to
investigate," and concluding that even if the lawyer was not 'knowingly a party to an
attempted fraud,' . . . his acts in so carelessly dealing with the truth did not constitute
that 'candor and fairness' required of lawyers, and that such conduct was also contrary
to 'honesty' in its true sense").
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (stating that it is professional
misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation").
31. Id. R. 1.0(d) (defining "fraud" or "fraudulent" to mean "conduct that is
fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has
a purpose to deceive"). An accompanying comment clarifies that the "purpose to
deceive" language is meant to exclude negligent misrepresentation or negligent failure
to apprise a person of relevant information, but makes no mention of recklessness. Id.
R. 1.0 cmt. 5. Note that the reference to "procedural law" means that Model Rule
8.4(c) governs fraud on the court as well as transactional fraud.
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to Model Rule 8.4(c).32 Does that indirect incorporation of recklessness
unreasonably conflict with the expressly stated actual knowledge standard
in Model Rules 1.2(d) and 4.1?31
One might try to resolve the Model Rule 8.4(c) problem by suggesting
that Model Rule 8.4(c) is limited in application to situations in which a
lawyer is not representing a client.34 Nothing, however, in the text or
comments of the rule so limits it, and a number of authorities apply it more
broadly.3 1 Moreover, if Model Rule 8.4(c) is limited only to lawyer
conduct apart from the representation of clients and the recklessness
standard is not included as part of the actual knowledge standard contained
in other rules, that creates an embarrassing possibility: the Model Rules, by
adopting a stricter standard of knowledge, endorse a more lenient standard
for fraud than do tort and criminal law. Model Rule 8.4(b) addresses this
problem with respect to criminal law by making it unethical for a lawyer to
"commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." On the other hand,
at least in theory, a lawyer could face liability in tort for fraud under a
32. See Romero-Barcelo v. Acevedo-Vila, 275 F. Supp. 2d 177, 206 (D.P.R. 2003)
(holding that a violation of Rule 8.4(c) can be found if a lawyer makes a statement
"with reckless ignorance of the truth or falsity thereof"); Office of Disciplinary Counsel
v. Anonymous, 714 A.2d 402, 407 (Pa. 1998) (applying a standard of "reckless
disregard to the truth or falsity" of a statement to discipline of a lawyer for knowingly
making a false statement); Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics & Conduct of the Iowa State Bar
Ass'n v. Ramey, 512 N.W.2d 569, 569 (Iowa 1994) (applying to predecessor to Rule
8.4(c) a "reckless disregard of the true facts" standard to suspend lawyer for knowingly
making a false statement); Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Sliffman, 625 A.2d 314, 321
(Md. 1993) (applying predecessor to Rule 8.4(c) and upholding a finding that lawyer
"must have known" of client fraud even though there was not "clear and convincing
evidence" that he actually knew); In re Dobson, 427 S.E.2d 166, 168 (S.C. 1993)
(finding that lawyer violated predecessor to Rule 8.4(c) by "deliberately evad[ing]
knowledge of facts which tended to implicate him in a fraudulent scheme"); People v.
Rader, 822 P.2d 950, 953 (Colo. 1992) (holding that lawyer violated predecessor to
Rule 8.4(c) by engaging in conduct "so careless or reckless that it must be deemed to
be knowing").
33. In one case in which federal prosecutors were disqualified because of violations
of Rule 4.1(a), the Government unsuccessfully raised the discrepancy between the
"knowledge" standard of Rule 4.1(a) and the absence of a knowledge standard in Rule
8.4(c) to argue that precedent finding recklessness sufficient scienter under Rule 8.4(c)
could not apply to Rule 4.1(a). United States v. Whittaker, 201 F.R.D. 363, 366-67
(E.D. Pa. 2001). The court rejected that argument and instead applied the recklessness
standard to both rules. Id.
34. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1 cmt. 1 ("For dishonest conduct
that does not amount to a false statement or for misrepresentations by a lawyer other
than in the course of representation a client, see Rule 8.4.").
35. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Op. 956 (2013); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 3 (referencing Model Rule 8.4 as an
example of a rule that applies "even when [lawyers] are acting in a nonprofessional
capacity").
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recklessness standard, while escaping discipline under the actual
knowledge standard, unless Model Rule 8.4(c) applied.36
Perhaps the response to all of this confusion is that it is much ado about
nothing. 37 The combination of the "inferred from circumstances" language
of Model Rule 1.0(f), the comments endorsing a willful blindness standard,
Model Rule 8.4(c), and case interpretations of both the ethics rules and
other law are arguably enough to make recklessness for all intents and
purposes the true standard of knowledge under the Model Rules. If that is
the case, however, why not clear up all ambiguity and just write
recklessness or willful blindness into Model Rule 1.0, or at least its
comment? The answer, in part, is that the knowledge standard is the key
marker in a contentious struggle over the scope of a lawyer's duty to
investigate. 38
II.

KNOWLEDGE AND THE DUTY TO INVESTIGATE

Recklessness is merely a doctrinal label. The more pragmatic question is
what must a lawyer do to avoid risking discipline or other consequences
when confronted with Model Rules whose duties are triggered by a
36. The Restatement makes this disparity clear in § 94, which contains two
different provisions addressing aiding and abetting by a lawyer, § 94(1) dealing with
liability and § 94(2) dealing with professional discipline. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94(1), (2) (2000). In comment a to that section, the
drafters call specific attention to the fact that other law "may define scienter ...
differently from" the disciplinary rules. Id. cmt. a.
37. See Moore, supra note 19, at 23-24 (suggesting that once sufficient
circumstantial evidence is developed, proving that a lawyer "must have known" will
generally not be difficult and will be sufficient to satisfy the actual knowledge
standard); see also Roiphe, supra note 9, at 212 (noting that some might argue that
given Model Rule 8.4(b), "it does not really matter whether the knowledge requirement
explicitly forbids [criminal] conduct" but rejecting that argument because of the
"symbolic function" that the Model Rules serve).
38. Professor Roiphe sees the struggle as reflecting different conceptions of the
lawyer's role. She argues:
The bar's persistent refusal to adopt a willful ignorance standard, except when
reacting to threats of more extensive external regulation, confirms that at least
in this instance, the bar is acting to ward off greater regulation by making a
nod toward its public function without in fact altering the zealous nature of its
constituents' practice.... The actual knowledge standard serves to mask a
fundamental disagreement. It papers over the real issues by allowing the
profession to articulate and publicly espouse a devotion to communal ends
while in reality encouraging lawyers to pursue the interests of their clients
without regard to the consequences.
Roiphe, supra note 9, at 221-22; see also Susan Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and

the State, 70 N.C. L. REv. 1389, 1422-23 (1992) (describing the bar's use of ethics
rules to "trump other law (or qualify it or render it ambiguous)").
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lawyer's "knowledge?" The lawyer might reason as follows. Model Rule
1.0(f)'s "actual knowledge" standard rejects a duty to investigate; in fact,
the absence of such a duty is what distinguishes "know" from "reasonably
should know" in the Model Rules. Thus, a lawyer faced with a suspicious
fact that is not sufficient along with other circumstances to impart actual
knowledge need not do anything further. In fact, investigating would be a
bad idea because that would put the lawyer at risk of violating the
knowledge-based rule.
Statements that the knowledge requirement implies the absence of a duty
to investigate are common. For example, when interpreting the knowledge
requirement of Rule 3.3, one court rejected a duty of inquiry even if a
lawyer has clear information indicating crime or fraud by the client, stating
that "the ethical rules, as written, [do not] require a lawyer to take
affirmative steps to discover client fraud or future crimes," and adding that
"imposing a duty to investigate the client would be incompatible with the
fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship." 39 Similarly, several
Restatement comments state that knowledge does not "assume" or
"require" a duty of inquiry, even when a "reasonable" or "prudent" lawyer
might have discovered certain facts. 40
Stated that way, the proposition is too broad. A more defensible
formulation is: the inclusion of a knowledge requirement in an ethics rule
expresses an intention not to create a duty of inquiry where one does not
otherwise exist. For example, Model Rule 8.3, which requires a lawyer to
report the misconduct of another lawyer when the first lawyer knows of it,
operates against a background in which the first lawyer has no general
obligation to inquire about the behavior of other lawyers or even to follow
up suspicions, unless it somehow benefits the lawyer's client. 4 1 By contast,
Model Rules that include a "reasonably should know" standard implicitly
39. United States v. Del Carpio-Cotrina, 733 F. Supp. 95, 99-100 n.9 (S.D. Fla.
1990). Despite the quoted statement, the court found that the lawyer actually knew that
his client had jumped bail and therefore had an obligation to report this fact to the
court.
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 cmt. h, illus. 6
(stating that "knowledge" for purposes of that section "neither assumes nor requires a
duty of inquiry"); id. § 94 cmt. g (stating that for purposes of § 94(2), the actual
knowledge standard does not require a lawyer "to make a particular kind of
investigation in order to ascertain more certainly what the facts are, although it will
often be prudent for the lawyer to do so"); id. § 120 cmt. c ("Actual knowledge does
not include unknown information, even if a reasonable lawyer would have discovered it
through inquiry.").
41. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) cmt. 2 (2013); see also Ill.
State Bar Ass'n on Prof I Conduct, Advisory Op. 90-28 (1991) (stating that a lawyer
who receives hearsay information about another lawyer's ethics violation has no duty
to investigate further, because "Rule 8.3 does not cast the members of the legal
profession in the role of investigators").
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create a duty to investigate that does not otherwise exist, usually to protect
some third party interest.42
Most duties to investigate, however, are created by substantive rules, not
by the scienter standard. In many situations, the Model Rules or other
regulations impose duties on a lawyer to investigate. 43 Duties of inquiry
are of particular importance for business lawyers engaged in transactional
practice, though similar duties exist for lawyers involved in civil litigation
as well as criminal prosecutors and defense lawyers 44. The remainder of
this Section discusses a number of examples, focusing on duties imposed
on business lawyers.
A.

Duties to Investigate in the Model Rules

Consider first duties of inquiry in the Model rules. The very first Model
Rule, stating the lawyer's fundamental duty of competence "requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation" 45 of a client, which in turn requires "inquiry into and
analysis of the legal and factual elements of the problem."4 6 In a recent
opinion on Client Due Diligence, Money Laundering, and Terrorist
Financing, the ABA reaffirmed that a lawyer's duty of competence
includes an obligation to investigate:
It would be prudent for lawyers to undertake Client Due Diligence
("CDD") in appropriate circumstances to avoid facilitating illegal
activity or being drawn unwittingly into a criminal activity. This
admonition is consistent with Informal Opinion 1470 (1981), where we
stated that "[a] lawyer cannot escape responsibility by avoiding inquiry.
A lawyer must be satisfied, on the facts before him and readily available
to him, that he can perform the requested services without abetting
fraudulent or criminal conduct and without relying on past client crime
or fraud to achieve results the client now wants." Further in that opinion
we stated that, pursuant to a lawyer's ethical obligation to act
competently, a duty to inquire further may also arise.
42. See supra note 11 (listing ethics rules using the "reasonably should know"
standard).
43. See, e.g., Roiphe, supra note 9, at 199-202. But cf HAZARD, JR., HODES, &
JARVIS, supra note 8, §§ 1-23, 1-52 (arguing that for many of the duties of investigation
imposed on lawyers, "the inquiry is in the nature of a 'probable cause hearing' rather
than an endeavor to establish personal knowledge on the lawyer's part").
44. For criminal defense lawyers, a separate set of rules promulgated by the ABA
impose a much more detailed duty to investigate than that found in Model Rule 1.1.
A.B.A, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION 119-20 (3d ed. 1993).
45. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1.
46. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 5.
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An appropriate assessment of the client and the client's objectives, and
the means for obtaining those objectives, are essential prerequisites for
accepting a new matter or continuing a representation as new facts
unfold. Rule 1.2(d) prohibits a lawyer from knowingly counseling or
assisting a client to commit a crime or fraud. A lawyer also is subject to
federal laws prohibiting conduct that aids, abets, or commits a violation
of U.S....

laws ....

The level of appropriate CDD varies depending on the risk profile of the
client, the country or geographic area of origin, or the legal services
involved. 47
Although the opinion does not discuss when a breach of the duty of
inquiry might support a finding of "knowledge," the reference to Model
Rule 1.2(d) and other law suggests some connection.

Other ethical duties that a lawyer owes to a client may also imply a duty
to investigate in certain circumstances. These duties include the duty to
communicate with the client, 48 to seek a client's informed consent, 4 9 to
avoid conflicts of interest,5 0 to "exercise independent judgment and render
candid advice,"5 1 or to determine a non-frivolous basis in fact and law for
bringing or defending against a civil claim.52 Other Model Rules and
comments recognize that lawyers may voluntarily undertake duties of
investigation.53
47. ABA Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 13-463 (2013)

(footnotes omitted).

48. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.").
49. See id. R. 1.0(e) (defining "informed consent" as "the agreement by a person to
a proposed course of action after the lawyer has communicated adequate information
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the
proposed course of conduct"); id. R. 1.0(e) cmt. 6 ("The lawyer must make reasonable
efforts to ensure that the client or other person possesses information reasonably
adequate to make an informed decision.").
50. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 3 ("To determine whether a
conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for
the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and non-litigation
matters the persons and issues involved.

. .

. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute

such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation of this rule.").
51.
52.

Id. R. 2.1.
See id. R. 3.1 & cmt. 2 ("What is required of lawyers . .. is that they inform

themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable law and determine
that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients' positions.").
53. See id. R. 1.11(e)(1) (including "investigation" as "matter" in which
government lawyer might be involved); id. R. 1.13(d) & cmts. 2, 7 (recognizing lawyer
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It is true that any duty to investigate that the lawyer owes to the client
under the Model Rules is not boundless. The duty to investigate is subject
to a reasonableness requirement. 54 Thus, a lawyer must calculate whether
the likely value of the investigation exceeds the costs.55 The scope of the
duty to investigate can also be limited by the nature and duration 56 of the
representation, as well as by specific agreements between the client and the
lawyer concerning the scope of the representation 5 7 or the type of advice
sought." Of course, these limits themselves have limits. A lawyer and
client cannot define the lawyer's responsibilities so narrowly as to abrogate
the lawyer's duty of competence.
B.

Duties to Investigate in Other Law

In addition to the Model Rules, other law may impose on lawyers a duty
to investigate. Most notably, malpractice law 60 and agency law 6 1 mirror
for an organization asked to investigate wrongdoing); id. R. 3.6 (imposing limits on
public speech for a lawyer who is participating or has participated in the
"investigation" of a matter; id. R. 4.2 cmt. 5 (discussing investigative activities of
government lawyers).
54. Model Rule 1.0(h) defines "reasonable" as "the conduct of a prudent and
competent lawyer." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(h).
55. Id. R. 1.1 cmt. 5 (stating that the "required attention and preparation are
determined in part by what is at stake").
56. See, e.g., Mich. Ethics Op. RI-13 (1989) (opining that a lawyer has no duty to
investigate the truth of a client's testimony once the lawyer is discharged for purposes
of complying with Rule 3.3).
57. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) ("A lawyer may limit the scope of
the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the circumstances and the client
gives informed consent.").
58. Id. R. 2.1 cmt. 5 ("A lawyer ordinarily has no duty to initiate investigation of a
client's affairs or to give advice that the client has indicated is unwarranted, but a
lawyer may initiate advice to a client when doing so appears to be in the client's
interest.").
59. See id. R. 1.2(c) (noting that the limit on the representation must be
"reasonable"); id. R. 1.2(c) cmt. 7 ("Although an agreement for a limited representation
does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide competent representation, the
limitation is a factor to be considered when determining the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation necessary for the representation.").
60. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 52 cmt. c
(2000) (stating that a "lawyer must perform tasks reasonably appropriate to the
representation, including, where appropriate, inquiry into facts"); see also Tush v.
Pharr, 68 P.3d 1239 (Alaska 2003) (stating that investigation into facts other lawyers
would customarily investigate is a professional duty).
61. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11(1) (2006) (imposing on an agent
"a duty to use reasonable effort to provide the principal with facts that the agent knows,
has reason to know or should know when .. . the agent knows or has reason to know
that the principal would wish to have the facts or the facts are material to the agent's
duties to the principal"); id. § 8.11(1) cmt. d ("An agent's duty of care may require the
agent to obtain information that is material to the principal's interests. If an agent's
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the duty of inquiry noted in the comment to Model Rule 1.1.62 Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure includes a duty of inquiry parallel to
that stated in the comment to Model Rule 3. 1.63 Lawyers engaged in
writing tax opinions 64 and other opinions65 often have duties to investigate
the underlying facts.
Legal duties of inquiry imposed are perhaps most developed for
securities lawyers. A well-known case discussing the duty of inquiry is
FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, which held that securities lawyers retained to

draft an offering document owe a duty "to protect the client from the
liability which may flow from promulgating a false or misleading offering
to investors" by conducting a "reasonable, independent investigation to
An older case
detect and correct false or misleading materials." 66

inquiry or investigation has been limited in some respect, the agent has a duty so to
inform the principal."). Of particular relevance to lawyers is the agent's duty to
provide information to the principal, including "information [that] may prove beneficial
to third parties because it may enable the principal to take action to avoid harm that
otherwise would be inflicted on third parties." Id. §. 8.11(1) cmt. b.
62. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 5.
63. CompareFED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (2010) (requiring a lawyer who files a pleading
in a civil case to certify to certain representations "to the best of the [lawyer's]
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances"), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 2 (requiring
lawyers to "inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases and the applicable
law and determine that they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients'
positions").
64. 31 C.F.R. § 10.35(c)(1)(i) (2012) (Circular 230) (requiring tax practitioners
who issue "covered opinions" to "use reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the
facts, which may relate to future events if a transaction is prospective or proposed, and
to determine which facts are relevant. ); see also ABA Formal Op. 346 (1982) ("The
lawyer who accepts as true the facts which the promoter tells him, when the lawyer
should know that a further inquiry would disclose that these facts are untrue, also gives
a false opinion.").
65. See, e.g., Excalibur Oil Inc. v. Sullivan, 616 F. Supp. 458, 463 (N.D. Ill. 1985)
("Necessarily implicit in [a contract by a lawyer to prepare a title opinion] is the
lawyer's duty to investigate the title with reasonable diligence and to report his findings
accurately."); cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 95(3) cmt. c
(stating that a lawyer giving an opinion does not usually have a duty of investigation
unless the opinion "is stated to be predicated upon a factual investigation by the
lawyer").
66. FDIC v. O'Melveny & Myers, 969 F.2d 744, 749 (9th Cir. 1992), rev'd on
other grounds, 512 U.S. 79 (1994). More recently, in Facciola v. Greenberg Traurig,
LLC, No. CV-10-1025-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 2268950, at *5 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2011),
the court, in rejecting a motion to dismiss a claim of violation of state securities laws
by a law firm, stated that the law firm, "as the primary drafter of the language in the
[private offering memoranda] had a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the
statements it made, or substantially participated in making, were not false or
misleading." The court did not rely solely on the breach of the duty of care, but found
other alleged facts supporting knowledge.
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discussing what counts as a reasonable investigation is Escott v. BarChris
Constr. Corp., in which the court stated:
It is claimed that a lawyer is entitled to rely on the statements of his
client and that to require him to verify their accuracy would set an
unreasonably high standard. This is too broad a generalization. It is all a
matter of degree. To require an audit would obviously be unreasonable.
On the other hand, to require a check of matters easil verifiable is not
unreasonable. Even honest clients can make mistakes.
A more recent example is In re Brooke Corp., 68 in which a group of
related entities selling financial products through franchisees retained a law
firm to act as securities counsel for several stock offerings and to advise the
client about the propriety of declaring dividends. After the entities went
bankrupt, the trustee sued the law firm for malpractice and aiding and
abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by the client's board. In rejecting the
law firm's motion to dismiss the malpractice claim, the court found that as
a result of information the law firm acquired during the representation, it
"became aware or should have become aware that [the client] improperly
recognized ... revenue and ... therefore ... knew or should have known
[the client] was insolvent."6 In rejecting the motion to dismiss the aiding
and abetting claim, the court relied on several allegations, including that the
law firm "knew or should have known [that] improper accounting policies
made [the client] appear solvent when it was not." 70
In addition, in-house corporate counsel and outside counsel who serve as
a company's "chief legal officer" for purposes of securities law compliance
are subject to a duty of inquiry imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley rules
governing lawyers. That duty, triggered by the receipt of a report by
another lawyer of "evidence of a material violation," requires the chief
legal officer to "cause such inquiry into the evidence of a material violation
as he or she reasonably believes is appropriate to determine whether the
material violation described in the report has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur."71

67.

Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).

68. In re Brooke Corp., 467 B.R. 513 (D. Kan. 2012).
69. Id. at 521.
70. Id. at 523.
71. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(2) (2012).

20 14

THE STATE OF LAWYER KNOWLEDGE

13 1

C. Implications ofDuties to Investigatefor Model Rules Including a
Knowledge Standard
The duty to investigate can have several implications for lawyers trying
to comply with their ethical obligations and faced with a rule including
duties triggered by what a lawyers "knows." First, the failure to investigate
can be an independent ethical violation of a different rule. Most broadly,
such a failure would violate the duty of competence in Model Rule 1.1.
Although disciplinary authorities generally do not discipline lawyers for
isolated negligent acts in the absence of other rule violations, they could
view more harshly intentional violations such as deliberately refraining
from undertaking a required, reasonable investigation, or deliberately
skewing a required investigation to avoid acquiring certain types of

knowledge. 7 2
Second, the breach of a duty to investigate imposed by other law could
result in liability, such as legal malpractice, even for conduct covered by an
ethical rule requiring actual knowledge.
Less obviously, duties to
investigate imposed by other law could turn the Model Rules including
knowledge standards from protections to vulnerabilities. Consider, for
example, a lawyer sued for malpractice for failure to investigate and
uncover a client's fraud. In such a case, in my view, the Model Rules on
fraud, all of which include a knowledge standard, could be relevant to
establish causation for the malpractice claim, even in the absence of actual
knowledge.73 That is, the claim may be that if the lawyer had exercised
due care and conducted a reasonable investigation, the lawyer would have
learned of the fraud. Once the lawyer knew of the fraud, the lawyer would
have certain obligations, as set out in Model Rules 1.2(d), 1.13(b), and 4.1,
including obligations not to continue in the fraud, 74 to withdraw, 75 to

72. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope 19 (2013) (stating that "the Rules
presuppose that whether or not discipline should be imposed for a violation, and the
severity of the sanction, depend on the circumstances, such as the willfulness and
seriousness of the violation, extenuating factors and whether there have been previous
violations."); cf ABA Formal Op. 335 n.1 (1974) (identifying a duty to investigate in
the context of offering an opinion about whether securities need to be registered, but
asserting that the duty is not "mandatory" and failure to adhere to the duty does not
violate the predecessor to Model Rule 1.1 unless "the lawyer's conduct in furnishing
his opinion involves indifference and a consistentfailure to carry out the obligations he
has assured to his client or a conscious disregard for the responsibility owed to his
client") (emphasis added).
73. I have made this argument in a legal malpractice case in which I served as an
expert witness.
74. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10 ("A lawyer may not
continue assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer originally supposes is legally
proper but then discovers is criminal or fraudulent.").
75. Id. RR. 1.16(a), 1.2 cmt. 10, 4.1 cmt. 3.
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disavow previously given opinions,' and even make a disclosure.n These
knowledge-based obligations would then be relevant as evidence of the
standard of care that would apply had the lawyer exercised the duty to
investigate. 78 If a court is willing to assume that the lawyer who had
fulfilled the duty to investigate would then have complied with the
obligations in fraud rules, the plaintiff can argue that the losses from the
fraud would have been avoided, thus establishing causation. As a result, a
lawyer who thinks that not knowing would provide a safe harbor against
liability might be in for a rude awakening. Precisely the opposite might be
true.
Third, a deliberate breach of a duty to investigate, when one otherwise
exists, could serve as circumstantial evidence supporting actual knowledge.
This is one possible meaning of Judge Friendly's statement of the willful
blindness rule, that a lawyer cannot close his eyes to facts he has a "duty to
see." The recklessness standard does not create this duty; rather, the duty is
an otherwise existing duty whose violation may be evidence of
recklessness depending on the circumstances. The recklessness is the
extreme unreasonableness in failing to satisfy the duty of inquiry when the
facts were suspicious enough and the costs of following up low enough.
Thus, when a duty to investigate exists, viewing the knowledge
requirement as negating or mitigating a duty to investigate that otherwise
exists can easily lead lawyers into trouble. 7 9 The great risk of the
knowledge requirement is that lawyers may view it as trumping an
otherwise existing duty of inquiry. Instead of lawyers asking whether a

76.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 10 ("In some cases,

withdrawal alone might be insufficient. It may be necessary for the lawyer to give
notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation or
the like."); id. R. 4.1 cmt. 3 ("Sometimes it may be necessary for the lawyer to give
notice of the fact of withdrawal and to disaffirm an opinion, document, affirmation or
the like."); id. RR. 1.13(c), 1.6(b)(2), (3).
77. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.1(b) & cmt. 3 ("In extreme cases,
substantive law may require a lawyer to disclose information related to the
representation to avoid being deemed to have assisted the client's crime or fraud. If the
lawyer can avoid assisting a client's crime or fraud only by disclosing this information,
then under paragraph (b) the lawyer is required to do so, unless the disclosure is
prohibited by Rule 1.6."). Model Rules 1.6(b)(2), (3) permit disclosure if a client has
used or is using a lawyer's services in furtherance of the crime or fraud. Id. RR.
1.6(b)(2), (3).
78. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope 20 (stating that "since the Rules
do establish standards of conduct by lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be
evidence of breach of the applicable standard of conduct").
79. As Professor Roiphe has recently argued, "it creates an odd and confusing
tension to encourage investigation through the substantive standards of attorney
conduct while simultaneously discouraging it indirectly through the definition of
knowledge." Roiphe, supra note 9, at 198-99.
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duty of inquiry exists in a situation, what they need to do to satisfy such a
duty, and whether the failure to satisfy such a duty may support an
inference of knowledge, lawyers instead tend to start with the question of
knowledge and never ask the duty of inquiry questions, or view them as
afterthoughts.
D.

How Knowledge-Based Model Rules Can MisleadLawyers: Model
Rules 1.13(b) and 3.8 as Examples

The failure of the Model Rules to recognize and articulate the
implications of duties to investigate for Model Rules including duties
triggered by lawyer "knowledge" may well contribute to lawyers
misunderstanding their ethical responsibilities. Perhaps the most troubling
rule in this respect is Model Rule 1.13(b), the up-the-ladder reporting
rule.so Despite the fact that both the Restatement 8' and the Sarbanes-Oxley
lawyer rules 8 2 abandoned the knowledge requirement for corporate counsel
80.

Model Rule 1.13(b) states:
If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other
person associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act
or refuses to act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of
a legal obligation to the organization, or a violation of law that reasonably
might be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to result in
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer shall proceed as is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization. Unless the
lawyer reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best interest of the
organization to do so, the lawyer shall refer the matter to higher authority in
the organization ....

R. 1.13(b); cf OHIO RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
1.13(b) (2013) (adopting "reasonably should know" standard); TEX. DISCIPLINARY
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.12(b) (2013) (duty triggered when lawyer "learns or
knows" of wrongdoing).
81. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96(2) (2000) (requiring
a lawyer representing an organization to take steps to protect the organizational client if
the lawyer "knows of circumstances indicatingthat a constituent of the organization has
engaged in action or intends to act in a way that violates a legal obligation to the
organization" under certain additional conditions) (emphasis added).
82. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1) (2012) (requiring an attorney appearing and practicing
before the SEC who "becomes aware of evidence of a material violation by the issuer
or by any officer, director, employee, or agent of the issuer," to report such evidence
within the organization). Unfortunately, the SEC rules effectively undermine this
lower "trigger" for lawyer action through an overly restrictive and convoluted
definition of "evidence of a material violation." Id. § 205.2(e) (defining "evidence of a
material violation" to mean "credible evidence, based upon which it would be
unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to
conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing,
or is about to occur."). For a critique of this rule, see Cramton, Cohen & Koniak, supra
note 19, at 751-64.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
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faced with potential client wrongdoing, the ABA retained it in the postEnron revisions to Model Rule 1.13(b), perhaps as a political tradeoff for
adopting in those revisions the controversial permissive disclosure
provisions in Model Rule 1.13(c) and Model Rule 1.6(b)." Read literally,
Model Rule 1.13(b) says that a lawyer has no obligation to take any action,
even action "reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization,"
if a lawyer does not "know" of wrongdoing within the organization,
though, as already discussed, the comment to Model Rule 1.13 adds a
"willful blindness" interpretation of knowledge.
Moreover, although another comment to Model Rule 1.13 states that the
"authority and responsibility provided in this Rule are concurrent with the
authority and responsibility provided in other Rules," neither this comment
nor any other comment to Model Rule 1. 13 makes any express reference to
Model Rule 1.1 or the lawyer's duty of competence to the organization
under other law,84 either of which may require the lawyer to act on less

83.

The revised text of Model Rule 1.13(c) provides:

Except as provided in paragraph (d), if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the highest
authority that can act on behalf of organization insists upon or fails to
address in a timely and appropriate manner an action or a refusal to act,
that is clearly a violation of law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the organization,
then the lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation whether
or not Rule 1.6 permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the organization.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(c). The revised text of Model Rule 1.6(b)
states in relevant part:
A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to
the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably
certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used or is using the
lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or
property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted from
the client's commission of a crime or fraud in furtherance of which the
client has used the lawyer's services.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b).
84. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 cmt. 6 (referencing Rules
1.2(d), 1.6, 1.8, 1.16, 3.3, and 4.1, but not Rules 1.1, 1.4, or 2.1).
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than "knowledge." 85 Nor is this omission likely accidental. The ABA
Task Force Report on Corporate Responsibility, which had endorsed
relaxing the "knowledge" requirement in Model Rule 1.13(b), nevertheless
rejected a "reasonably should know" standard because of criticisms that
"this standard may impose a duty, of uncertain extent, to investigate that
could only be evaluated after the fact with the benefit of hindsight," and
that "the lawyer may not be able to insist that the client pay for, or even
permit, the investigation that may, in the light of hindsight, prove to have
been necessary." 86 The hindsight danger is a legitimate concern, but one
that exists for any lawyer subject to a duty of inquiry. It is not obvious why
the Model Rules should single out lawyers for organizations for more
lenient treatment than other lawyers. Similarly, the fact that a client might
not want or be willing to pay for an investigation is a relevant fact, but
again, that is true for many actions that might be necessary to satisfy the
duty of care. Most importantly, the criticisms seem to start from the
premise that a duty to investigate for corporate lawyers does not otherwise
exist unless Model Rule 1.13(b) establishes it. That proposition is, in my
view, incorrect.
Another Model Rule that runs the risk of misleading lawyers, in a
completely different context, is Model Rule 3.8, the ethics rule for
prosecutors.
Of its eight subsections, four include a knowledge
requirement. All of these have to do with evidence or information that
would benefit the defense. The starting point for understanding the rule is
stated in the first comment to Model Rule 3.8:
A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply
that of an advocate. This responsibility carries with it specific
obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice, that
guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence, and that special
precautions are taken to prevent and to rectify the conviction of innocent
87
persons.
How does the knowledge requirement affect these obligations? Model
Rule 3.8(a) requires a prosecutor to "refrain from prosecuting a charge that
the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." The use of the
85. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 96 cmt. e
(stating that the "lawyer ... must not knowingly or negligently assist any constituent
[of the organization] to breach a legal duty to the organization," and adding that a
"lawyer is also required to act diligently and to exercise care by taking steps to prevent
reasonably foreseeable harm to a client.").
86. Report of the American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility, 59 Bus. LAW. 145, 167 n.76 (2003).

87.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT

R. 3.8 cmt. 1.
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knowledge requirement here is odd. Model Rule 3.8(a) is the parallel to
Model Rule 3.1, the rule for civil litigation, which does not include a
knowledge requirement and implicitly recognizes a duty of inquiry as a
necessary means of satisfying the rule. If the knowledge requirement is
supposed to indicate the lack of a duty of inquiry, how does that square
with the prosecutor's obligation, stated in the comment, "to see that ...
guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence," or with the
prosecutor's duties under other law? Perhaps the knowledge requirement
in Model Rule 3.8(a) is intended simply to identify a quantum of certainty,
not to limit the duty of inquiry. But nothing in the comments provides any
guidance on this question.
On the other hand, the knowledge requirement in Model Rules 3.8(g)
and (h), adopted by the ABA in 2008, operates against a backdrop of no
duty of investigation. Both rules have to do with the responsibility of a
prosecutor after a defendant's conviction, when the prosecutor's duties to
collect and examine evidence have generally ended. Model Rules 3.8(g)
and (h) create exceptions to that proposition when the prosecutor "knows"
of exculpatory evidence. Under Model Rule 3.8(g), if a prosecutor
"knows" of "new, credible and material evidence creating a reasonable
likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit" the crime, and the
conviction was obtained in the prosecutor's jurisdiction, the prosecutor has
a duty to "undertake further investigation."
Unlike Model Rule 3.8(a), Model Rule 3.8(g) includes the terms
"credible" and "reasonable likelihood" to address the level of certainty of
knowledge, and the fact that knowledge triggers an expressly stated duty to
investigate suggests that one does not otherwise exist. Model Rule 3.8(h)
then addresses the outcome of that investigation, requiring that if, as a
result of such investigation, the prosecutor "knows of clear and convincing
evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor's jurisdiction was
convicted of an of an offense that the defendant did not commit, the
prosecutor shall seek to remedy the conviction."8 9 Here, knowledge
combined with a higher level of certainty (clear and convincing evidence)
entails a stronger duty to take remedial action.
Lastly, Model Rule 3.8(d) requires a prosecutor to "make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense." 90 Does the knowledge requirement here operate against a

88.
89.
90.
to the

Id. R. 3.8(g)(2)(ii).
Id. R. 3.8(h).
Id. R. 3.8(d). The rule also requires a prosecutor to "disclose to the defense and
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor" in
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background duty of inquiry? A recent ABA opinion interpreting Model
Rule 3.8(d) provides a sensible answer, but its analysis of the knowledge
requirement takes an unnecessarily confusing and circuitous path to get
there. The opinion's discussion begins with the technically correct, but
misleading, point that "Rule 3.8(d) does not establish a duty to undertake
an investigation in search of exculpatory evidence." 9 1 The point is
misleading because it suggests, though does not explicitly say, that there is
no duty to investigate apartfrom Model Rule 3.8(d). The opinion then
compounds the problem by stating that the "knowledge requirement thus
limits what might otherwise appear to be an obligation substantially more
onerous than prosecutors' legal obligations under other law."92 Although
not entirely clear, this statement appears to suggest that the knowledge
requirement limits any otherwise existing duty to investigate. Fortunately,
the opinion goes on to list several exceptions to the supposed absence of a
duty to investigate: when the prosecutor "actually knows or infers from the
circumstances, or it is obvious, that the files contain favorable evidence or
information," or if the prosecutor "was closing his eyes to the existence of
such evidence or information." The opinion's apparent endorsement of the
Benjamin willful blindness standard-in a rule that actually lacks a willful
blindness comment-thus goes beyond what the comments to Model Rules
1.13, 3.3, and 4.2 endorse. In a footnote at the end of the same paragraph,
the opinion then finally adds:
Other law may require prosecutors to make efforts to seek and review
information not then known to them. Moreover, Rules 1.1 and 1.3
require prosecutors to exercise competence and diligence, which would
encompass complying with discovery obligations established by
constitutional law, statutes, and court rules, and may require prosecutors
to seek evidence and information not then within their knowledge and
.93
possession.
The opinion's tentative and almost grudging acknowledgment of a duty of
inquiry takes us almost to the opposite of where the discussion started.
Imagine if the opinion had started the other way. Generally, among their
duties to their government clients, which include a public function,

connection with sentencing. The rule includes an exception if the court relieves the
prosecutor of his or her responsibilities.
91. ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009).
The opinion repeats this point several times in the same paragraph in case we missed it
the first time.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. Id. n.27 (emphasis added).
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prosecutors have a duty to reasonably investigate ongoing criminal matters
and must at least be attuned during such investigations to the possibility of
exculpatory evidence, which if discovered, must be disclosed to the
defense. A deliberate and unreasonable failure to investigate may support a
conclusion that the prosecutor acted recklessly or with willful blindness,
and therefore "knowingly," in not disclosing exculpatory evidence.9 4 The
result would be essentially the same as the one in the ABA opinion, but the
tone would feel very different.
The point is that when lawyers encounter a knowledge standard in the
ethics rules, they should not think of it as negating or limiting a duty of
inquiry, but should rather first ask whether such a duty otherwise exists in
other ethics rules or law, and then, if it does, consider the scope of that
duty, what failures might violate it, and whether a deliberate violation of
that duty to avoid knowing certain information might serve as evidence of
knowledge. If no duty of inquiry otherwise exists, the knowledge
requirement does not create one in the ethics rule in which it appears, and
the willful blindness standard should be interpreted in light of that fact.
The duty of inquiry, or lack of one, should inform the knowledge standard,
not the other way around.
III. IMPUTED KNOWLEDGE AND THE DUTY OF INTRA-FIRM
COMMUNICATION

Apart from adopting an actual knowledge standard to emphasize the lack
of intent to create a duty of inquiry, the Model Rule drafters also may have
intended the actual knowledge standard to preclude discipline in cases in
which a lawyer's knowledge is not personal, but "imputed" from the
knowledge of others. Imputed knowledge is presumptive knowledge, and
therefore not actual knowledge. 95 The broad statement that the knowledge
standard precludes imputation is, however, as misleading as the statement
that the knowledge standard precludes a duty of inquiry.
The doctrine of imputed knowledge is a well-recognized principle of the
law of agency, partnership, and other business organizations. Agency law
imputes to the principal facts material to the agent's duties to the principal
that an agent knows or has reason to know. 9 6 Similarly, the law of
94. Cf MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILiTY EC 7-13 (1980) (stating that "a
prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely because he
believes it will damage the prosecutor's case or aid the accused").
95. See, e.g., Va. Legal Ethics Op. 1862 (2012) (stating that Rule 3.8(d) differs
from Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) because Brady imputes knowledge of
state actors, such as the police, to the prosecutor, whereas Rule 3.8 does not).
96. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (2006). The reverse is not true:
agency law does not impute a principal's knowledge to the agent. Id. § 5.03 cmt. g.
Nor does the law impute the knowledge of one agent to another.
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partnership imputes to the partnership a partner's knowledge of any fact
relating to the partnership. 97
The doctrine of imputed knowledge is grounded in the agent's duty to
communicate information to the principal,98 as well as the desire to
discourage the principal's own willful blindness. The doctrine is also
linked to vicarious liability: when knowledge is an element of an agent's
tort, a principal's liability for that tort can be understood either as vicarious
or, if the knowledge is imputed to the principal, direct.99 Imputed
knowledge does not generally, however, support criminal liability. 00
The imputed knowledge doctrine can apply to lawyers in several ways.
First, lawyers are agents of their clients and so clients are bound by what
their lawyers know. Second, lawyers practicing in firms are agents of those
firms, and so a lawyer's knowledge may be imputed to the lawyer's firm.
The remainder of this section considers the connection of these rules of
imputation to a lawyer's ethical obligations, and the implications of
imputation rules and the principles underlying those rules for the ethical
definition of knowledge.
A. Imputation of a Lawyer's Knowledge to a Client
The law of agency imputes to a principal not only knowledge an agent
actually has, but also knowledge that an agent has reason to know. 0 1 The

97. REv. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 102(f) (1997). "Knowledge" is defined as
"actual knowledge." Id. § 102(a). If, however, "notice" to a partnership is sufficient to
bind the partnership, then "notice" to the partner of a fact is sufficient, and "notice" is
defined to include a situation in which a partner "has reason to know [the fact] exists
from all of the facts known to the [partner] at the time in question." Id. § 102(b)(3).
98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11.
99. See, e.g., FDIC v. Braemoor Assocs., 686 F.2d 550, 556 (1982) (finding a joint
venture liable for a partner's fraud under either the imputed knowledge or vicarious
liability sections of the partnership statute).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Archer, 671 F.3d 149, 159 n.4 (2d Cir. 2011) ("In
general, the law does not impute criminal liability to those who are unaware of the
criminal activity."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. d(7) (stating that
"personal knowledge may be required for some forms of criminal liability . .. and
when a statute requires personal knowledge for a particular legal consequence");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. d (2000) ("A lawyer's
knowledge will not be attributed to the client to establish criminal liability, although
evidence of the lawyer's knowledge might be admissible to show what the client
knew.").
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03. According to Comment b: "An
agent has reason to know a fact when a reasonable person in the agent's position would
infer the existence of the fact, in light of facts that the agent does know." Id. § 5.03 cmt.
b. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers accepts this imputed
knowledge doctrine, but does not say whether it requires actual knowledge or whether
"reason to know" is sufficient. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §
28(1) ("Information imparted to a lawyer during and related to the representation of a
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imputation rule thus implicitly recognizes yet another version of the duty of
inquiry, though it appears to be a duty triggered by more of a recklessness
standard than a negligence standard.102 Thus, if an agent, including a
lawyer, intentionally or recklessly fails to know information that could
affect the principal's interests, the principal incurs the consequences of
imputed knowledge and may have a cause of action against the agent for
breach of fiduciary duty. As noted in the previous section, lawyers have an
ethical as well as a legal duty to protect their clients from liability, and so
must be wary of unreasonably failing to know material facts simply to
protect themselves from the ethical consequences of having knowledge,
because doing so might disadvantage their clients. In the case of imputing
a lawyer's knowledge to a client, then, the actual knowledge requirements
of the ethics rules do not supplant the imputed knowledge rule. Rather, the
imputed knowledge doctrine of agency law qualifies the actual knowledge
requirements of the ethics rules.
B.

Imputation of a Lawyer's Knowledge to a Lawyer's Firm

In addition, the imputed knowledge rule applies to lawyers acting in
firms. Lawyers are agents of their firms just as they are agents of their
clients. Law firms are thus bound by what their lawyers know and have
reason to know. The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers accepts
this imputed knowledge rule for purposes of vicarious liability of a law
firm as an entity.103 The application of this aspect of imputed knowledge in
disciplinary cases seems limited, however, because the ethics rules in most
jurisdictions apply to individual lawyers, not law firms. 104 Nevertheless,
the principles underlying imputed knowledge may still be relevant in
several ways.

client is attributed to the client for the purpose of determining the client's rights and
liabilities in matters in which the lawyer represents the client, unless those rights or
liabilities require proof of the client's personal knowledge or intentions or the lawyer's
legal duties preclude disclosure of information to the client.").
102. See, e.g., Southport Little League v. Vaughan, 734 N.E.2d 261, 265 (Ind. App.
2000) ("This court has long recognized that a principal is charged with the knowledge
of that which his agent by ordinary care could have known where the agent has
received sufficient information to awaken inquiry."). The Restatement (Third) of
Agency is somewhat unclear about the duty of inquiry in this situation. Comment b to
§ 5.03 states that there is no imputation if "the agent's failure to know the fact is the
consequence of the agent's breach of a duty owed to the principal or to a third party."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b. The Reporter's Note to § 5.03,
however, cites Southport and quotes the above language from the opinion, apparently
with approval. See id. § 5.03 & reporter's note to cmt. b.
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58 & cmt. c.
104. The exceptions are New York and New Jersey. See N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2009); N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2002).
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First, even when the imputed knowledge doctrine is not strictly
applicable, the lawyer's duty to provide information to the firm, 05 as well
as the duty of competence owed to the client, may necessitate that the
lawyer communicate with other firm lawyers involved in a representation.
Even though the knowledge of one lawyer is not strictly "imputed" to
another lawyer in the same firm, a breach of these duties of intra-firm
communication may mean that a lawyer "knows." According to the
Restatement:
If the facts warrant, a finder of fact may infer that the lawyer gained
information possessed by other associated lawyers, such as other lawyers
in the same firm, where such an inference would be warranted due to the
particular circumstances of the persons working together. Thus, for
example, in particular circumstances it may be reasonable to infer that a
lawyer who regularly consulted about a matter with another lawyer in the
same law firm became aware of the other lawyer's information about a
fact. 106
That is, a lawyer's participation in a firm is part of the "special situation"
and "continuity of conduct" Judge Friendly found relevant to the question
of lawyer knowledge.
This aspect of imputed knowledge is particularly important in corporate
representations involving large numbers of lawyers in a firm who work on
different aspects of the representation. For example, many lawyers from
Vinson & Elkins LLP represented Enron in a host of transactional matters.
If these lawyers had been charged with violating Model Rule 1.2(d) for
assisting in Enron's fraud (they were not), some of them would likely have
tried to defend by saying they did not know about problems in transactions
that they did not personally work on. In response, the disciplinary counsel
would probably argue that the lawyers were likely talking to each other and
coordinating their activities and that even if they were not, they should
have been. 107 The point is that the actual knowledge standard in the Model
Rules may provide less protection than lawyers think, even if the imputed
knowledge rule does not strictly apply between lawyers in the same firm.

105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.11 cmt. b ("The principal may
direct that information be furnished to another agent or another person designated by
the principal.").
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 94 cmt. g.
107. 1 served as an expert witness for the bankruptcy trustee in the case against
Vinson & Elkins alleging that it had violated the securities laws in its representation of
Enron. In my expert declaration, I made a similar argument.
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A second way the principles of imputed knowledge are potentially
relevant to lawyers acting in firms appears in the Model Rules on the
supervision of lawyers, Model Rule 5.1, and of nonlawyers, Model Rule
5.3. These rules have similar structures. Subsection (a) of both rules
requires partners to "make reasonableefforts to ensure that the firm has in
effect measures giving reasonable assurance that" the conduct of lawyers
and nonlawyers is consistent with the ethics rules. 0 8 Subsection (b) of
both rules requires any lawyer with direct supervisory authority over
another lawyer or nonlawyer to "make reasonable efforts to ensure that"
the conduct of the supervised person is consistent with the ethics rules. 109
Subsection (c) of both rules then describes the conditions under which any
lawyer is "responsible" for conduct of another lawyer or nonlawyer who
violates the ethics rules. Those conditions are that the lawyer (1) orders the
conduct; (2) ratifies "specific conduct" of which he has "knowledge"; or
(3) serves as a partner, manager, or supervisor and "fails to take reasonable
remedial action" when the lawyer "knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated."' 10
Once again, the imputed knowledge doctrine would not apply to
supervisory lawyers individually, only to their firms, and the ethics rules
are directed at individual lawyers. But the principle underlying imputed
knowledge may still apply. One of the rationales for imputed knowledge is
that it deters the principal from discouraging the agent to provide the
principal with harmful information. Imputation means the principal will be
affected by the information whether or not the principal seeks it. The
situations governed by Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3 do not involve a principal,
but rather a supervisory lawyer, who is in an analogous position. An actual
knowledge requirement could discourage the supervisory lawyer from
asking too many questions about what the supervised lawyer or nonlawyers
is doing.

108. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RR. 5.1(a), 5.3(a) (2013) (emphasis
added); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11(1)

(lawyers); id. § 11(4)(a)(i) (nonlawyers).
109. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RR. 5.1(b), 5.3(b) (emphasis added); see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11(1) (lawyers); id. §

11(4)(a)(i) (nonlawyers).
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§

RR. 5.1(c), 5.3(c); see also RESTATEMENT
11(3), 11(4)(b).

Rules 5.1(c) and 5.3(c)

suggest that a lawyer who is not a partner, manager, or supervisor could "order" or
"ratify" conduct but it is not clear when that would be the case. In addition, although
the agency law of ratification uses an actual knowledge requirement, see RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 4.06 & cmt. b, it also recognizes ratification when a principal "is
shown to have had knowledge of facts that would have led a reasonable person to
investigate further, but the principal ratified without further investigation." Id. § 4.06
& cmt. d.
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Consider then the structure of Model Rules 5.1 and 5.3. What is the
relationship between the first two subsections of both rules, which impose a
"reasonableness" standard comparable to a negligent supervision standard
in agency law,"' and the last subsection, which imposes a "knowledge"
standard that seems to reject not only imputation, but negligence? 1 l 2 At
least with respect to a "supervisory lawyer," it cannot be that the
"knowledge" requirement of Model Rules 5.1(c) and 5.3(c) in any way
diminishes the duty of reasonable monitoring established by Model Rules
5.1(b) and 5.3(b).' 13 That would create the same problem that the imputed
knowledge doctrine is meant to solve. The point of the knowledge
requirement must therefore be to enhance the duty that otherwise exists by
effectively creating a presumption of unreasonable monitoring if a
supervising lawyer actually knows of a supervised person's misconduct and
does nothing. In addition, because some of the responsibilities in Model
Rules 5.1(c) and 5.3(c) are not limited to supervisory lawyers, but apply to
any lawyer (or to any partner), the knowledge requirement protects lawyers
who do not have specific duties to monitor other lawyers in the firm.
A Connecticut ethics opinion concerning a managing partner's
obligations with respect to a bookkeeper who misuses client trust funds
provides a good example of the confusion that these Model Rules can
create. The opinion states that "[n]egligent supervision of employees
handling trust accounts is not an excuse for violations of Model Rule
5.3(b)."I1 4 This is a puzzling statement. Why is negligent supervision not
itself a violation of Model Rule 5.3(b)? The opinion then adds:

111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§ 7.05(1).

112. Several jurisdictions adopt a "reasonably should know" standard in their
version of Rule 5.1(c). See D.C. RULES OF PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 5.1(c)(2) (2006); N.Y.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(d)(2)(ii) (2009). Georgia recognizes the willful
blindness doctrine in interpreting Rule 5.1(c). See Ga. Formal Advisory Op. 05-10
(2010) (stating that "knowledge could be imputed to local counsel if he or she,
suspicious that lead counsel was engaging in or was about to engage in a violation of
ethical requirements, sought to avoid acquiring actual knowledge of the conduct").
113. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 6 ("Professional
misconduct by a lawyer under supervision could reveal a violation of paragraph (b) on
the part of the supervisory lawyer even though it does not entail a violation of
paragraph (c) because there was no direction, ratification or knowledge of the
violation."). One commentator acknowledges "that the Rule 5.1 (c)(2) duty to rectify
misconduct is likely to arise in the wake of Rule 5.1(a) and (b) violations," but then
goes on to stress that "Model Rule 5.1(c)(2) imposes an actual knowledge
requirement," not "constructive knowledge" without explaining the relationship
between the rules.

Douglas R. Richmond, Law Firm Partners As Their Brothers'

Keepers, 96 KY. L.J. 231, 245-46 (2008).
114. Conn. Eth. Op. 97-38 (1997).
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Although Rule 5.3(c) appears to limit responsibility to those situations
where the lawyer orders or with knowledge ratifies the employees [sic]
acts, courts have been unwilling to excuse negligent supervision of
employees handling trust accounts.

. .

. [T]he fiduciary responsibilities

involved in maintaining client funds accounts impute knowledge of the
state of those accounts to the lawyer. Rule 5.3(c) does not permit
negligent supervision of employees handling client fund accounts. 5
The result is sensible, but the reasoning is muddled. Although the
opinion recognizes that Rule 5.3(c) neither prohibits negligent supervision
nor imputes knowledge, it nevertheless struggles to find a violation of that
rule based on those concepts. Instead, the opinion should have emphasized
that the knowledge standard in Rule 5.3(c) does not limit the duty of
supervision that otherwise exists under Rule 5.3(b). A supervisory lawyer
reading the opinion, however, could be misled into thinking that the
opinion creates a special exception to Rule 5.3(c) for trust accounts rather
than a general approach for reconciling Rules 5.3(b) and 5.3(c), and that a
lack of actual knowledge will protect that lawyer from disciplinary liability
given the knowledge requirement of Rule 5.3(c).
C. Imputation of a Lawyer's Knowledge in Conflict ofInterest Cases
A special case of imputed knowledge that greatly affects lawyers
concerns conflicts of interest. The Model Rules include a number of
imputation rules relating to conflicts of interest. The general conflict of
interest imputation rule, Model Rule 1.10(a), provides that "[w]hile lawyers
are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a client
when any one of them practicing alone would be prohibited from doing so
by Rules 1.7 or 1.9," except in certain circumstances.116 This rule, under
which an individual lawyer's conflict gets imputed to the lawyer's firm, is
related to imputed knowledge and in part based on it. A lawyer's exposure
to confidential information often results in a conflict of interest, and the
conflict imputation rule essentially presumes that all lawyers in the firm are
exposed to the confidential information, just as the imputed knowledge rule
does. Model Rule 1.10(a) is in one sense more expansive than the imputed
knowledge doctrine because the imputation applies to individual lawyers,
not the firm as an entity (though courts relying on Model Rule 1.10 in the
context of disqualification motions treat it as if it applies to firms). On the

115. Id.
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.10(a); see also id. RR. 1.11(b),
1.12(c), 1.18(c). But cf id. R. 1.8(k) (applying an imputation rule for lawyer-client
The Restatement
conflict of interests, but omitting a knowledge requirement).
imputation rule, § 123, does not include a knowledge requirement.
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other hand, Model Rule 1.10(a) includes a provision that seems
inconsistent with imputed knowledge. Model Rule 1.10(a) imputes a
conflict only if the other lawyers in the firm "knowingly" represent a client
when another lawyer in the firm would be prohibited from doing so. As
Professor Moore has pointed out, however, the meaning of "knowingly" in
this rule is unclear.117 It could mean that a lawyer must know that the
lawyer is representing a client, or it could mean that a lawyer must know
that the representation of the client would violate the conflict of interest
rules.
A recently decided case demonstrates the difference between imputed
conflicts and imputed knowledge, and also reveals some of the mischief
that the "actual knowledge" standard can cause. In Northam v. Virginia
State Bar,118 a husband and wife separately contacted two different lawyers
in the same law firm about representing them in a divorce action. Lewis,
the lawyer contacted by the wife, interviewed her and at one point asked
who her husband's lawyer was. She responded that it was Northam,
another lawyer in Lewis's firm. Lewis immediately stopped the interview
and the next day told Northam that he had met with the wife. Lewis
subsequently told the wife he could not represent her. Northam, however,
continued to represent the husband. The wife later filed a disciplinary
complaint, alleging that Northam had violated Virginia's Rule 1.10. The
Disciplinary Board agreed, but the Virginia Supreme Court reversed on the
ground that the Board had not specifically made a factual finding that
Northam "knew" that Lewis was disqualified from representing the
husband. 119
The Virginia State Bar tried to argue that Lewis's knowledge of the
wife's confidential information should be imputed to his partner, Northam.
Alternatively, the Bar argued that there was enough evidence to support a
finding of actual knowledge because Lewis had claimed that he told
Northam in their meeting that "I think we have a problem and I'm getting
out."l20 Northam, however, claimed he did not recall such a statement.
The court ignored the argument about imputed knowledge, probably
believing it was not sufficient to satisfy the actual knowledge requirement
of Rule 1.10. The court rejected the alternative holding because the
Disciplinary Board did not explicitly resolve the conflict in the two
partners' testimony in its factual findings, and because different
conclusions could be drawn from the mere fact that Northam knew that
117. Moore, supra note 19, at 2; see also id. at 46.
118. Northam v. Va. State Bar, 737 S.E.2d 905 (2013).
119. Id. at 911. The court thus adopted Professor Moore's second interpretation of

"knowingly." Northam certainly knew he was representing the husband.
120. Id. at 909.
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Lewis and the wife had met.121 A dissenting justice took issue with the
sufficiency of evidence point but also ignored the Bar's imputation of
knowledge argument.1 2 2 But why should a court interpret the ethics rule on
imputation of conflicts, which is based in part on the principles of imputed
knowledge, to protect lawyers who fail to investigate, and therefore lack
actual knowledge of, a partner's conflict?
Under the facts of the case, a court could have found that Northam had
actual knowledge under Rule 1.10(a) based on the fact that Lewis had
given him sufficient information (even under his version of the facts) to
give rise to a duty to investigate the conflict. Unfortunately, no one raised
this argument, or the possibility that Northam's deliberate failure to
investigate could have violated Virginia's Rule 1.1 or Rule 1.7,123 or
breached Northam's duty of care under the law of malpractice.12 4 Northam
is thus a striking example of a court ignoring the principle I have advocated
in this essay: an actual knowledge requirement does not negate or limit a
duty to investigate that otherwise exists. The case sends the potentially
dangerous and misleading message to Virginia lawyers that they can avoid
discipline for imputed conflicts if they do not ask too many questions.
Perhaps the court's implicit message is that Lewis had the bigger
responsibility to make sure that Northam knew there was a conflict
problem,125 though Lewis probably thought he had made sufficient
disclosure. What Lewis did not do was take advantage of the ability to set
up a screen, which Virginia's Rule 1.18 permits for prospective clients such

121. Id. at 910-11.
122. Id. at 912-13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
123. See supra notes 49-50, 54. Oregon's version of the "actual knowledge"
definition expressly addresses this issue. Its Rule 1.0(h) defines "knowingly" as
denoting "actual knowledge of the fact in question, except that for purposes of
determining a lawyer's knowledge of the existence of a conflict of interest, all facts
which the lawyer knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, will
be attributed to the lawyer. A person's knowledge may be inferred from
circumstances." OR. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(h) (2013).
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAW § 123 cmt. a (2000) (noting
that "an imputed conflict might be evidence of a negligent breach of duty by each of
the lawyers"); id. § 121 cmt. g ("For purposes of identifying conflicts of interest, a
lawyer should have reasonable procedures, appropriate to the size and type of firm and
practice, to detect conflicts of interest, including procedures to determine in both
litigation and nonlitigation matters the parties and interests involve in each
representation.").
125. Cf Moore, supra note 19, at 48 (arguing that "knowing" standard of Model
Rule 1.10(a) should apply to "the lawyer's awareness or lack of awareness of facts that
cause the associated lawyer to be disqualified under Rule 1.7 or Rule 1.9 because "a
lawyer whose conflict is merely imputed . .. relies to a large extent on the associated
lawyer to disclose the facts that prohibit that lawyer from undertaking the
representation").
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as the wife. 12 6 Neither the court nor the dissent makes any mention of this
possibility.
Screening solutions, recognized in a number of other Model Rules,127
create an additional "knowledge" wrinkle. Screens must be "timely" and
the comment to the definition of "screened" requires that lawyers
implement screens when they "reasonably should know" that screens are
necessary.12 8 How does this standard work with the "knowledge"
requirement of Model Rule 1.10(a)? One interpretation would give priority
to the knowledge requirement. That is, until the other lawyers "know" of a
29
conflict, they need not institute a screen even if they should have known.1
But that interpretation is troubling. Once the conflict is "known," the client
could already have revealed much information to the lawyer. Moreover, if
the rule did not allow screening (as Model Rule 1.10 did not until recently),
imputed disqualification would occur the moment the conflict was
known.13 0 In that case, the "knowledge" requirement would not discourage
lawyers from discovering the conflict. Rather they would have an
incentive to discover the conflict early, to avoid risking disqualification, or
to seek a waiver. Adding a screening solution to an imputation rule should
not transform the "knowingly" requirement into a free pass for lawyers in
the firm until someone points out the conflict, at which point they are
allowed to erect a screen.
CONCLUSION

The actual knowledge standard pervades the Model Rules and applies to
lawyers in all areas of practice, whether transactional, litigation, or
criminal. Given the importance of the actual knowledge standard, the
Model Rule drafters need to provide better guidance to lawyers about the
meaning of knowledge under the Model Rules. They should explicitly
adopt Judge Friendly's definition of willful blindness in the definition of
knowledge or its comment to be consistent with other law, in particular the
law of fraud. Such a change would clear up the confusion created by the
current definition of knowledge in Model Rule 1.0; the comments to some

126. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.18(d) (2013); VA. RULES OF
PROF'L. CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2009).
127. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT RR. 1.10(a)(2), 1.11(b), 1.12(c).
128. Id. R. 1.0(k) & cmt. 10.

129. See Lutron Elecs. Co. v. Crestron Elecs., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-707, 2010 WL
4720693, at *5 (D. Utah Nov. 12, 2010). This case was a motion for disqualification,
not a disciplinary matter, and the court relied on other factors besides its conclusion
that Utah's version of Rule 1.10 was not violated because the lawyers did not "know"
of the conflict and instituted a screen once they did. Id.
130. See Moore, supra note 19, at 34.
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knowledge-based rules, but not others adopting something like the
recklessness standard; and the relationship of the knowledge-based rules to
Model Rule 8.4(c). The drafters should further clarify where a duty to
investigate or communicate otherwise exists, as a matter of other ethics
rules or other law, in comments to rules including a knowledge
requirement. Most important, they should add a comment to the definition
of knowledge stating that the knowledge requirement does not negate or
limit any duty to investigate or communicate that otherwise exists, and that
the deliberate breach of these duties can be evidence of willful blindness
and therefore knowledge. As the rules stand now, lawyers may be too
tempted to conclude that when the rules use an actual knowledge standard,
lawyers will be protected if they intentionally fail to acquire actual
knowledge. That is a risky position to take, and one that not only exposes
lawyers to potential disciplinary and other liability, but can harm clients
and third parties as well. Lawyers have a right to know when they risk
violating the ethics rules. As things stand today, their knowledge about the
knowledge requirement is defective.

